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1 International Bank of Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement, 27
December 1945, UNTS 2, 13, Art. 1 (IBRD Articles of Agreement); International De-
velopment Association Articles of Agreement, 24 January 1960, UNTS 439, 249, Art. 1
(IDA Articles of Agreement); Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development
Bank, 30 December 1959, UNTS 389, 69, Art. 1 (Agreement Establishing the IADB);
Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank, 4 August 1963, UNTS 510, 3,
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Debt crises in developing countries, although not unprecedented, first became
significant international financial threats when Mexico announced in August
1982 that it could no longer service its external debts. Since then, the Interna-
tional Financial Institutions (IFIs), particularly the World Bank Group and the
International Monetary Fund, have played key roles in helping successive waves
of their member countries deal with debt crises. While the details of their role in
each of these waves have differed, they have always offered these member coun-
tries both financial services and technical advice on how to negotiate and manage
their way out of their debt troubles.
While the question of how effectively the IFIs have performed their interna-
tional economic, financial, social, environmental and developmental responsi-
bilities in their work with these debtor countries has been extensively analyzed
and debated, their compliance with their applicable international legal obliga-
tions has been less rigorously examined. The IFIs’ responsibility in this regard,
is based on their mandates, as defined in their Articles of Agreements,1 and gen-
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Art. 1 and 2 (Agreement Establishing the AFDB); Agreement Establishing the Asian
Development Bank, 22 August 1966, UNTS 571, 123, Art. 1 and 2 (Agreement Estab-
lishing the ADB); Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, 28 March 1991, ILM 29 (1990), 1083, Art. 1 and 2 (Agreement Estab-
lishing the EBRD) and Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 27
December 1945, UNTS 2, 39, Art. 1 (IMF Articles of Agreement).
2 See Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and
Egypt, ICJ Reports 1980, 73, para. 37; the International Law Commission’s First Report
on Responsibility of International Organizations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/532 of 26 March
2003, Art. 3, and the International Law Commission’s Third Report on Responsibility
of International Organizations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/553 of 13 May 2005, Art. 8.
3 IBRD Articles of Agreement (note 1), Art. 1; IDA Articles of Agreement (note 1),
Art. 1; Agreement Establishing the IADB (note 1), Art. 1; Agreement Establishing the
AFDB (note 1), Art. 2; Agreement Establishing the ADB (note 1), Art. 2; Agreement
Establishing the EBRD (note 1), Art. 1 and 2.
4 It should be noted that over time and through the codification efforts of entities like
the International Law Commission and the International Law Association the customary
international legal obligations of international organization are likely to evolve.
5 See, for example, the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Develop-
ment Report, Globalization with a Human Face, available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/
reports/global/hdr1999/.
eral principles of customary international law.2 Based on the former, the IFIs, as
a group, are expected to contribute to the long term growth and development of
their Member States in ways that are consistent with the overall growth of inter-
national trade and that are consistent with, and do not undermine the, interna-
tional monetary and financial system.3 Their customary international legal
obligations include upholding such principles as pacta sunt servanda and rebus
sic stantibus and respecting the sovereignty of their Member States.4
When measured against these legal standards, the IFIs have had a mixed record
in meeting their international legal obligations towards their member countries.
Until the advent of the current financial crisis, it was clear that the IFIs have
effectively helped the totality of their membership avoid the worst case scenario
of a breakdown in the international financial system, in general, and in financial
flows to developing countries, in particular. However, as is well known, there
is an on-going debate about how well they have met their responsibility to
promote sustainable development and poverty alleviation in all their member
countries – given, for example, the increase over this period in inequality within
and between countries.5 In addition, the way in which the IFIs have implemented
their mandates to achieve these objectives has resulted in significant expansion
in the scope of their missions, which has led many to raise concerns about their
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6 For more information on the World Bank Group, see: http://go.worldbank.org/3QT
2P1GNH0.
7 IBRD Articles of Agreement (note 1), Art. 1.
encroachment into the areas of responsibility of other international organizations
and the efficacy and the legitimacy of their roles in the international financial
order.
In order to establish this thesis, the next section of this paper will briefly de-
scribe the key IFIs, namely the World Bank Group (WBG or WB) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the international legal obligations that
arise from their Articles of Agreements. The third section will provide a brief
overview of the IFIs’ role in the debt crises of their Member States over the 25
year period starting with the onset of the Mexican debt crisis in August 1982
and of their implementation of the applicable international law principles. The
fourth chapter will evaluate their compliance with their international legal obli-
gations.
B. The IFIs and their International Legal Obligations
The most prominent IFIs involved in the management of developing country
debt are the World Bank Group and the IMF. In legal and governance terms,
they remain the prototypes for all other IFIs. Consequently, they will be the
focus of this chapter.
I. The World Bank Group
The World Bank Group consists of five separate legal entities: the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Devel-
opment Association (IDA); the International Finance Corporation; the Multilat-
eral Investment Guarantee Agency; and the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes. For current purposes, the two most relevant members
of this group are the IBRD and the IDA (collectively “the World Bank”).6
Pursuant to its Articles of Agreement,7 the objectives of the IBRD are (i) as-
sisting in the reconstruction and development of the territories of Members
States by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes; (ii)
4 Daniel Bradlow
8 IBRD Articles of Agreement (note 1), Art. 3 Sect. 4(vii).
9 Ibid.
10 IDA Articles of Agreement (note 1), Art. 1.
11 The Bank also renders important non-financial services to its members. See the
World Bank website, available at: http://go.worldbank.org/1YXPMBNDO0 and http://
go.worldbank.org/DM4A38OWJ0.
promoting private foreign investment by means of guarantees or participations
in loans and other investments made by private investors; (iii) promoting the
long-range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of equi-
librium in balances of payments by encouraging international investment (iv)
arranging loans made or guaranteed by it so that the more useful and urgent
projects are dealt with first; and (v) and conducting its operations with due
regard to the effect of international investment on business conditions in the ter-
ritories of Member States. Thus, the IBRD was intended primarily to be a fund-
er of development “projects.”8 Only in “special circumstance”9 was it supposed
to provide funding for non-project, policy-based purposes.
The purposes of IDA compliment those of the IBRD.10 They are to promote
economic development, increase productivity and thus raise standards of living
in the poorest member countries by providing financing to meet their develop-
mental requirements on terms which are more flexible and bear less heavily on
the balance of payments than those of conventional loans.
The IBRD raises its funds based on the capital provided by its Member
States. At the time of accepting membership, each Member State is allocated a
share of the Bank’s capital, based on a formula that depends on such factors as
its size and importance in the global economy. The Member State pays a por-
tion of the price in cash and the balance in promissory notes. The IBRD relies
on these pledges to raise funding in international financial markets.
The IBRD carries out its purposes principally through loan operations,11
made either to a member of the Bank or to a public or private entity or enter-
prises within the territory of a member. When the borrower is not a member
government, the loan must be fully guaranteed by the member government in
whose territory the project to be financed is located. Consequently, every
lending operation of the Bank leads to a loan or guarantee agreement with a
Member State.
IDA, because it provides funding on such generous terms, is not self-sustaining.
Consequently, its capital is regularly replenished by its Member States. IDA is
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12 In principle, States are eligible to borrow from IDA provided that their per capita
income is below 1,506 US Dollar p.a.; in practice, however, IDA lends to States with a
per capita income p.a. of around 925 US Dollar (figures are in 2008 US Dollars).
13 Aron Broches, International Legal Aspects of the Operations of the World Bank,
Recueil des Cours 98 (1959), 297; John W. Head, Evolution of the Governing Law for
Loan Agreements of the World Bank and other Multilateral Development Banks, Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 90 (1996), 214. It should be noted that loan agreements
with non-sovereign borrowers are always accompanied by guarantee agreements with
the borrower’s sovereign that are governed by international law. The loan agreements
with state-owned entities are not governed by international law but nonetheless “ex-
clude” the operation of municipal law.
14 General Conditions for Loans, International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, 1 July 2005, Art. VIII, Sect. 8.01 (as amended through 12 February 2008); General
Conditions for Credits and Grants, International Development Association, 1 July 2005,
Art. VII, Sect. 7.01 (as amended through 15 October 2006).
15 General Conditions for Loans, International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (note 14), Art. VIII, Sect. 8.04; General Conditions for Credits and Grants, Inter-
national Development Association (note 14), Art. VII, Sect. 7.03.
expected to use these replenishments to extend development credits to Member
States with per capita incomes below about 1,506 US Dollar per annum.12 It
provides these Member States with development credits for similar purposes and
in similar form to IBRD financing but on significantly more attractive terms (zero-
interest loans over 30 years with ten years grace period).
Interestingly, both the IBRD and IDA credit agreements with their Member
States appear to be governed by international law.13 Specifically, their agree-
ments provide that the rights and obligations of the Bank under such agreements
shall be valid and enforceable in accordance with their terms notwithstanding the
law of any State or political subdivision thereof to the contrary.14 The agree-
ments also provide for arbitration in event of a dispute.15
II. IMF
According to Article 1 of its Articles of Agreement, the purpose of the IMF
is to promote international monetary cooperation through consultation and col-
laboration; to promote orderly and stable exchange arrangements among mem-
bers; to assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments for
international trade; and to make the resources of the IMF “temporarily avail-
able” to members “under adequate safeguards” for the purpose of correcting
their balance of payments problems “without resorting to measures destructive
6 Daniel Bradlow
16 See IMF Articles of Agreement (note 1), Art. 1 and The IMF at a Glance, available
at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/glance.htm.
17 25 % of the subscription is provided in SDRs or convertible currency and 75 % in
local currency. The first 25 %, is known as the “reserve tranche” and is relatively freely
available to Member States and is treated as part of their reserves. See International
Monetary Fund, IMF Quotas, available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/
quotas.htm.
18 IMF Articles of Agreement (note 1), Art. 3 Sect. 1.
19 The Stand-By Arrangement was the first IMF Facility and is the basic means
through which it provides financing to its Member States. See Joseph Gold, The Stand-
By Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund: A Commentary on Their Formal,
Legal and Financial Aspects (1970). The Extended Fund Facility (dating from 1974)
allows a member country to draw up to a specified amount over a longer term, usually
three or four years. The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility was introduced in 1999.
It replaced the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility under which the IMF gives
low-interest financing to help the poorest member countries facing protracted balance-
of-payments problems, see: http://www/imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm.
20 IMF, Press Release No. 97/59 of 17 December 1997, IMF Approves Supplemental
Reserve Facility.
21 IMF, Press Release No. 99/14 of 25 April 1999, IMF Tightens Defences Against
Financial Contagion by Establishing Contingent Credit Lines. The Supplemental Re-
serve Facility is financed with resources raised through past sales of IMF-owned gold
and with loans and grants provided to the IMF for this purpose, mainly by wealthy
countries – see James Raymond Vreeland, The IMF and Economic Development
(2003), 10. The Supplemental Reserve Facility provides additional short-term financing
of national or international prosperity” and to shorten the duration and lessen
the severity of the disequilibria in the balance of payments of members.16
Upon joining the IMF, each Member State is assigned a quota which, like the
IBRD share allocations, depends on its size and contribution to the global econ-
omy. This quota determines the size of its subscription, which is the amount of
funds17 it is required to place on deposit with the institution, its vote in the IMF,
and its access to IMF financing.18 The amount of financing that the IMF will
offer a Member State is a percentage – normally up to 300 % – of its quota.
Except for the reserve tranche all IMF financing is subject to the IMF’s policy
of conditionality, which refers to the policy and other adjustment measures that
the IMF expects the Member State to undertake in return for the IMF financing.
The IMF’s financing facilities that involve conditionality include the Stand-By
Arrangement, the Extended Fund Facility and the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility.19 Apart from these arrangements, the IMF introduced the Sup-
plemental Reserve Facility in 199720 and the Contingent Credit Line facility in
1999.21 The purpose of the conditionality22 is to ensure that IMF resources are
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to a member country experiencing exceptional balance-of-payments difficulty because
of a sudden and disruptive loss of market confidence reflected in capital outflows. The
Contingent Credit Line facility provides a precautionary line of defense. This enables a
member country pursuing strong economic policies to obtain financing on a short-term
basis when faced by a sudden and disruptive loss of market confidence because of con-
tagion from difficulties in other countries.
22 IMF Guidelines on Conditionality, available at: http://www.imf.org/External/np/
pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.pdf. Clause 11 of the Guidelines on Conditionality pro-
vides that the IMF will monitor the borrowing country’s performance under agreements
entered into with the IMF on the basis of prior actions, performance criteria, program
and other reviews, and other variables and measures established as structural bench-
marks or indicative targets.
23 IMF Articles of Agreement (note 1), Art. 4 Sect. 3(a). See IMF, Public Information
Notice No. 07/69 of 21 June 2007, IMF Executive Board Adopts New Decision on
Bilateral Surveillance Over Members’ Policies, available at: http://www.imf.org/external/
np/sec/pn/2007/pn0769.htm. See also John W. Head, Seven Deadly Sins: An Assessment
of Criticisms Directed at the International Monetary Fund, Kansas Law Review (Kan.
L. Rev.) 52 (2004), 521.
24 Policy Statement on IMF Technical Assistance, 2001, available at: http://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/psta/index.htm.
used by Member States to resolve their balance of payments problems in a man-
ner that is consistent with the IMF’s Articles. In order to promote compliance
with the conditionality, the IMF disburses its funds on a piecemeal basis (rather
than in a single lump sum) and only if the country can demonstrate compliance
with the IMF’s conditionalities. IMF expects its financing to provide Member
States “with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments
without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosper-
ity” as stated in IMF’s Articles of Agreement, Article I(v).
The IMF executes its oversight functions through surveillance and technical
assistance. Although surveillance can take several forms, the most important
form is country surveillance.23 In accordance with Article 4, § 3(b) of the IMF’s
Articles of Agreement, the IMF conducts regular consultations, normally once
a year, with each member country, regarding its economic and financial poli-
cies. These consultations typically culminate in the issuance of observations and
recommendations by the IMF regarding each member country’s economic and
financial policy performance. In addition, the IMF undertakes frequent monitor-
ing of economic and financial factors in those countries that have borrowed
funds from the IMF. The IMF also engages in technical assistance to help mem-
ber countries design and implement financial policies (both monetary and fis-
cal), draft and review legislation, and build institutional capacity.24
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31 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations, opened for signature on 21 March
1986. The Convention has not yet obtained the requisite ratification of 35 States to enter
into force. The Convention is available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/conventions/1_2_1986.pdf.
32 See also Roberto Dañino Zapata, Why Treaties Matter (Opening Remarks – First
Annual Conference “Interpretation Under The Vienna Convention On The Law of
Treaties – 25 Years On”), 17 January 2006, available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/INTLAWJUSTICE/214576-1139604306966/20817203/WhyTreatiesMatterLondon
011706.pdf.
III. The General Principles of International Law Applicable
to IFIs and Sovereign Debt
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)25 codifies custo-
mary international law relating to international agreements. Article 24 outlines
rules governing the signing of treaties and the entry of treaties into force.26
Articles 26 and 31 implement the principle of pacta sunt servanda as a rule for
the interpretation of treaties.27 Pacta sunt servanda means “[e]very treaty in force
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”28
Article 34 echoes the preamble of VCLT by incorporating the doctrine of
“free consent,” which holds that treaties only apply to consenting States and
that a treaty does not create “obligations or rights for a third State without its
consent.”29 Finally, Article 62 codifies the principle of rebus sic stantibus,
which means that a fundamental change of circumstances can be a practical and
legal justification for failing to perform treaty obligations.30 The principle of
rebus sic stantibus is thus an exception to the rule of pacta sunt servanda.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and Interna-
tional Organizations or Between International Organizations,31 although not yet
in force, makes clear that the principles of pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic
stantibus are also applicable to agreements involving the IFIs.32
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33 Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The Creative Role of the Lawyer – Example: The Office of
the World Bank’s General Counsel, Catholic University Law Review 48 (1999), 1041.
34 See also Joseph Gold, Public International Law in the International Monetary Sys-
tem, Southwestern Law Journal 38 (1984), 799.
35 Ibid., 1048.
36 See Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The World Bank and “Governance” Issues in its Bor-
rowing Members, in: id. (ed.), The World Bank in a Changing World (1991), 53.
IV. Interpretation of the IFIs’ Articles of Agreement
As mentioned above, for IFIs such as the World Bank and the IMF, their con-
stituent instrument is their Articles of Agreement. In the case of these two
institutions, their international agreements were written at a time when the land-
scape of financial transactions and the profile and even the number of sister
international institutions was very different from today’s realities. Ibrahim
Shihata, former General Counsel of the World Bank, explained the challenge of
both preserving the vision set at the time the institution was created in 1944 and
adapting to new realities:33
On the one hand, the Bank is expected at all times to adapt itself to the changing
needs of the world, if only to ensure its continued relevance. On the other hand, it is
extremely difficult to introduce changes through amendment of the Articles of
Agreement. […] How then can a counsel of that institution answer constant questions
about the law governing Bank policies and operations which are, of course, subject
to its Articles of Agreement? How does he or she identify the rules applicable to the
Bank’s varying transactions, which may be derived from international law or such
domestic law as may be applicable, and cannot be inconsistent with the provisions of
the Articles? This is perhaps the most challenging task performed by the office of the
Bank’s General Counsel.34
His solution was that the General Counsel can facilitate the expansion of Bank
operations into new areas by issuing legal opinions, endorsed by the Executive
Directors that, based on an interpretation of the Articles, clarify the conditions
under which new types of operations can be undertaken.35 It was through this
means that the World Bank expanded its operations to support such activities as
good governance, legal and judicial reform and anti-corruption programs. In his
opinions on these issues, he argued that these activities were permissible because
they would have such a direct, preponderant and clear effect on the country’s
economic development prospects that they can be treated as falling within its
economic mandate as articulated in Article I of its Articles of Agreement.36
The issue of how the IFIs should respond to the sovereign debt crises posed
a challenge to the institutions. Their Articles of Agreement provide no explicit
10 Daniel Bradlow
37 Lous J. Ross, International Financial Institutions’ Response to Crises, American
Society of International Law Proceedings 90 (1996), 428, 434 et seq.
38 Ibid.
39 IBRD Articles of Agreement (note 1), Art. 1.
40 Ibid., Art. 3 Sect. (vii): “Loans made or guaranteed by the Bank shall, except in
special circumstances, be for the purpose of specific projects of reconstruction or devel-
opment.”
41 See discussion of Brady Plan infra, note 65.
42 See the World Bank website, available at: http://go.worldbank.org/2CRHS4N500.
43 IMF Articles of Agreement (note 1). Art. 1 outlines that the “purposes of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund are: […] (v) To give confidence to members by making the
mandates for them to become involved in helping reduce the commercial bank
debts of their members. Nevertheless, both the World Bank and the IMF were
able to find legal justifications for their participation in these operations.37
Initially, this was more difficult for the World Bank. The drafting history of
the World Bank’s articles reveals that the possibility of the Bank renegotiating
its debts to its member countries was discussed, but ultimately dropped.38 The
Articles of Agreement stipulate that the Bank will only provide loans and guar-
antees for “productive purposes”39 or in “special circumstances.”40 The legal for-
mula that was used to justify specific debt related assistance was based on the
“special circumstances” exception. First the World Bank determined that alle-
viation of the debt burden was a necessary condition for a country’s further sus-
tained development and growth. Second, the World Bank’s General Counsel
opined that, provided a debtor country had a sound financing plan and a satisfac-
tory adjustment program, the loans were legally justified if it could be demon-
strated that the debt reduction would have a material effect on the country’s
investment prospects and overall development. Consequently, the Bank was able
to make loans to several highly indebted middle income countries to enable them
to either finance debt buybacks or to purchase collateral for the new discount and
par bonds issued under the Brady plan.41 On this basis, the World Bank was also
able to set up a separate debt reduction facility to provide grants to the low-
income (IDA-only) countries to facilitate debt reduction transactions.42
The IMF, with its mandate to help countries deal with balance of payments
problems, faced an easier legal challenge. It was able to justify its debt related
actions by arguing such action was permissible under Article 1(v) of its Articles
of Agreement because the financing was directly linked to solving a country’s
balance of payments crisis.43
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general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards,
thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of pay-
ments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.”
44 See, for example, Hal S. Scott, International Finance: Transactions Policy and
Regulation (15th ed. 2008), 865–868. For more information on the debt of the 17 largest
debtor countries, see William R. Cline, International Debt Reexamined (1995). In 1982,
these 17 countries net external debt equal to 290 % of the value of their exports.
45 See Barry Eichengreen/Peter H. Lindert (eds.), The International Debt Crisis in
Historical Perspective (1989) (collecting essays on the crisis in relation to past debt
crises); John H. Makin, The Global Debt Crisis: America’s Growing Involvement
(1984) (discussing the origins of the crisis and the early years of its development);
Alfred J. Watkins, Till Debt Do Us Part: Who Wins, Who Loses and Who Pays for the
International Debt Crisis (1986) (discussing US and Latin American perspectives on the
crisis) cited in Philip J. Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and
its Implications for Future Restructurings, Fordham Law Review 64 (1996), 2701.
C. IFIs and Third World Debt Crisis 
While there had been third world sovereign debt crises before, the Mexican
announcement in August of 1982 that it could no longer service its debts to
foreign creditors set off an unprecedented crisis in developing country sover-
eign debt. Mexico’s announcement was followed shortly by similar news from
Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela in Latin America, countries such as
Zambia, Zaire, and Nigeria in Africa, and the Philippines in Asia. The result
was that between August 1982 and October 1983, 28 countries were forced to
renegotiate their debts. Collectively, these countries owed their commercial
bank creditors 239 billion US Dollar, which was equal to more than 200 % of
the total capital of the nine largest US banks.44
The story of the IFIs involvement in the sovereign debt crises of the past 25
years is a long and complicated tale. Due to space limitations, it is not possible
to cover all aspects of it in this article.45 Consequently this chapter only consid-
ers how the IFIs applied international legal principles in their actions in their
operations with debtor Member States.
In this regard, it is important to note that it is difficult for the IFIs to play a
neutral role in the negotiations between their Member States and their creditors.
If the IFIs extend financing to the States before they reach agreement with their
creditors, they would, in effect, be strengthening the Member States’ negotiating
position. This follows from the fact that the State would have more resources
with which to meet its domestic needs and so could more easily withstand pres-
sure to settle from their creditors. On the other hand, if the IFIs refuse to lend
12 Daniel Bradlow
46 James M. Boughton, Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund 1979–
1989 (2001), 757–764.
47 IMF, Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors – Further Consider-
ation of the Good Faith Criterion Prepared by the International Capital Markets, Policy
Development and Review and Legal Departments (In consultation with the other De-
partments), Approved by Gerd Häusler, Timothy Geithner and François Gianviti, 30
July 2002, available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/privcred/073002.pdf (IMF,
Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors); IMF Legal Department, Se-
lected Decisions and Selected Documents of the IMF, Thirtieth Issue – Arrears to Credi-
tors and Debt Strategy, As updated as of 30 June 2006, available at: http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/sd/index.asp?decision=3153-(70/95)#P511_163413.
while the Member States are in arrears to their creditors, they strengthen the bar-
gaining position of the creditors.
The Articles of the IFIs do not provide clear guidance on whether the IFIs
should use their financing to help the bargaining position of either the creditor
or the debtor. It is possible to make convincing arguments to support either po-
sition. As described below, at different stages of the third world debt crisis, the
IFIs adopted different views on these issues.
I. Stage 1: Enforcing Pacta Sunt Servanda (1982–1985)
During this stage, both the IMF and the World Bank worked to enforce the
principle of pacta sunt servanda. They would not lend to countries in arrears to
their creditors.46 They insisted that the borrowers meet their current debt servicing
obligations and conditioned any IFI support on Member State compliance with
this obligation. In addition, they linked the availability of their support to an
agreement between the Member State and its commercial bank creditors. During
this stage, the typical financing arrangement included some combination of a
payment by the debtor of interest payments in arrears, new money that helped
members service their existing and the restructured debt obligations, and an
obligation to continue meeting all debt related obligations in a timely manner.47
The rationale for this position was two-fold. First, the IMF in particular,
argued that it was in everyone’s interest to protect the integrity and functioning
of the creditors, whose collapse could threaten the stability of the whole interna-
tional financial system. This required the debtors to remain current on their debt
obligations, unless these obligations were renegotiated in agreements concluded
freely between the debtor and both its official and commercial creditors. In
addition, the IFIs might have been concerned about the moral hazard and legal
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48 Shihata (note 36), 8, 25.
49 See John Williamson (ed.), IMF Conditionality (1983).
50 Stijn Claessens/Enrica Detragiache/Ravi Kanbur/Peter Wickham, Analytical As-
pects of the Debt Problems of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (1996), available at:
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/13466_wps1618.pdf.
51 There is extensive literature on this topic and it is not possible to list all of it. See
e.g. Williamson (note 49) and Giovanni Corina/Richard Jolly/Frances Stewart, Adjust-
ment with a Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth (1987).
precedents that would be set if countries were able, with relative impunity, to
breach their obligations on their debt contracts.
During this stage, the World Bank, relying on the “special circumstances” ex-
ception in its Articles, provided financing in the form of “structural adjustment
loans,” which were not linked to specific projects, but were intended to help the
debtor country pay for essential imports and meet its debt servicing obligations
in return for undertaking structural and social reforms.48 The IMF provided the
financing through its existing financing facilities. Both the IMF and the World
Bank conditioned their financing on the debtor countries making such adjust-
ments in their economic policies as tighter monetary policy, reduced budget
deficits, as well as broader liberalization policies such as reducing government
regulation and opening up the economy to foreign trade.49 The argument was
that these policies would not only help the country resolve its debt problems but
restore it to a path towards sustainable development.50
The position taken by the IFIs faced substantial criticism. The conditions
they attached to their financial operations were controversial, with some critics
claiming that far from advancing the short or long term interests of their Mem-
ber States, they actually undermined them.51 Consequently, they argued, the
IFIs were not conforming to their mandates. In addition, the position taken by
both institutions led them each to begin expanding their scope of operations –
the World Bank became increasingly involved in policy based lending. The
IMF began attaching structural conditions to their financing, such as conditions
related to public administration and privatization of State owned enterprises,
which seemed to some critics far removed from its original macro-economic
and monetary mandate.
14 Daniel Bradlow
52 There is such a large amount of literature on this topic that it is not possible to list all
of it. See generally Eichengreen/Lindert (note 45); Makin (note 45); Watkins (note 45).
53 See Statement by the Honorable James A. Baker, III, Secretary of the Treasury of
the United States, before the Joint Annual Meeting of the IMF and World Bank of 8 Oc-
tober 1985 in Seoul, South Korea, reprinted in: U.S. Department of Treasury News of
8 October 1985 and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Annual
Meeting Summary Proceedings (1985), 205–214.
54 However, as neither side cooperated, the plan was short-lived, Boughton (note 46),
417.
55 Boughton (note 46), 427 et seq. Also see Alberto. G. Santos, Beyond Baker and
Brady: Deeper Debt Reduction for Latin American Sovereign Debtors, New York Uni-
versity Law Review 66 (1991), 66, 77.
56 Enrique R. Carrasco, Chile, Its Foreign Commercial Bank Creditors and Its Vulner-
able Groups: An Assessment of the Cooperative Case-by Case Approach to the Debt
Crisis, Law and Policy in International Business (Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus.) 24 (1993), 286.
II. Stage 2: Struggle to Balance Pacta Sunt Servanda
and Rebus Sic Stantibus52 (1985–1988)
On 9 October 1985, at the annual meeting of the World Bank and the IMF,
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury James A. Baker announced a plan that he
claimed would resolve the debt crisis.53 Baker’s proposal called on commercial
banks to make 20 billion US Dollar in new loans to the fifteen most highly in-
debted Least Developed Countries (LDCs) over the course of the three years
between 1986 and 1988. Under Baker’s plan, the IMF, World Bank, and other
multilateral lending institutions would contribute an additional nine billion US
Dollar in new loans over the same three-year period. In exchange for these
loans, Baker called on the debtor countries to implement austerity plans moni-
tored by the IMF.54
Although the Baker Plan had the virtue of recognizing that the debt crisis was
not merely a temporary disruption, the plan had limited success. It did not differ
substantially from the rescheduling process that had developed between the
banks and the debtor countries during the first three years of the crisis. More-
over, net lending to the debtor countries under the Baker Plan did not approach
the 29 billion US Dollar envisioned.55
Both debtors and creditors were less than enthusiastic about the Baker Plan.
Creditors were concerned that they were entering an endless cycle of reschedul-
ing and bridge loan requests. The debtor countries also began to realize that by
incurring new debt to keep current their interest payments on old loans they
were merely increasing their debt burden.56
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On 27 January 2007, the Senior Vice-President and General Counsel, Roberto Dañino,
issued “Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank,” (Dañino
The result was that the IFIs, as well as many creditors and debtors began to
recognize that it was not feasible to enforce the original debt obligations. In
other words they began, at least implicitly, to recognize that the application of
the pacta sunt servanda principle would have to be modified by rebus sic
stantibus. This did not mean that they were ready yet to excuse borrowers from
performing their debt obligations. However, it did mean that they were willing
to offer them more generous rescheduling options and even to apply the princi-
ple of keeping debts current more flexibly. It is important to note however that
the IFIs, in their role as creditors did not change their position from enforcing
the debt as originally agreed, i.e. enforcing pacta sunt servanda.
During this period, the IFIs began to suggest that the problems of the debtor
countries were not only caused by their high levels of debt but also by problems
in their governance arrangements.57 Consequently, they slowly began to expand
the conditions attached to their financing to include governance reforms in their
Member States.
This meant that the World Bank was beginning to include issues which are
not self-evidently “economic,” such as the environment, governance, and gen-
der, in its scope of operations.58 This, in turn, began to raise concerns about the
precise meaning of the political prohibition in its Articles of Agreement. In par-
ticular, it raised questions about how the World Bank was interpreting the re-
quirement that it should base its decisions on “economic considerations” and
should not take the “political character” of its borrowers into account. These
terms are not defined in the Bank’s Articles. However, the General Counsel
addressed the matter in his Legal Opinion on Governance, and determined that
any issue that has “direct and obvious economic effects” could be treated as
inside the mandate of the Bank even if it also had clear political dimensions.59
This position helped stimulate interest in the Bank’s responsibilities in regard to
human rights.60
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Opinion). It indicates that human rights may constitute legitimate considerations for the
Bank where they have economic ramifications or impacts, and it confirms the facilitative
role the Bank may play in supporting its members fulfill their human rights obligations.
See: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTSITETOOLS/0,,content
MDK:20749693~pagePK:98400~piPK:98424~theSitePK:95474,00.html.
61 See John W. Head, Law and Policy in International Financial Institutions: The
Changing Role of Law in the IMF and the Multilateral Development Banks, Kansas
Journal of Law & Public Policy 17 (2007), 194; Daniel Bradlow, Should the Interna-
tional Financial Institutions Play a Role in the Implementation and Enforcement of
International Humanitarian Law?, Kan. L. Rev. 50 (2002), 695 and Daniel Bradlow/
Claudio Grossman, Limited Mandates and Intertwined Problems: A New Challenge for
the World Bank and the IMF, Human Rights Quarterly 17 (1995), 411.
62 See Head (note 61), 206; Robert Hockett, From Macro to Micro to “Mission Creep:”
Defending the IMF’s Emerging Concern with the Infrastructural Prerequisites to Global
Financial Stability, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 41 (2002), 153, 177–178.
It also laid the foundation for a substantial later expansion of the Bank’s
mandate to the point where it began encroaching into the areas of “jurisdiction”
of the IMF and other international organizations.
The IMF’s Articles do not have an explicit political prohibition. Instead, it is
merely required to take the domestic social and political conditions in its Mem-
ber States into account in its work in the country. This requirement has been
interpreted as amounting to a political prohibition. However, it has not pre-
vented the IMF from addressing governance issues in its Member States when
it deems it necessary. This position, over time, has facilitated a similar broad
expansion in the IMF’s scope of operations, so that it too is now encroaching
into the “jurisdiction” of the World Bank and other international organizations.
The IFIs “mission creep” has attracted criticisms.61 In fact, some of these cri-
tiques have accused the IFIs of not acting lawfully within the parameters of
their charters. For example, these critics claim that the World Bank has ex-
panded its operations into activities that can be seen as “political” in the sense
that they are not primarily economic in focus – such as anti-corruption, judicial
reform, gender issues. This has resulted, they claim, in an expansion of the
World Bank’s purposes and operations into areas in which it has no authority
under its original charters. According to its critics, these activities have resulted
in these institutions acting ultra vires. It has also been argued that it undermined
their efficacy.62 Similarly, the IMF’s critics contend that the expansion of the
IMF’s operations into such activities as supporting “governance” issues and
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structural reform has extended its operations into areas in which it has question-
able authority to act.63
III. Stage 3: The “Triumph” of Rebus Sic Stantibus (1988–2007)
By gradually setting aside loan-loss reserves, the banks had, by 1989, gained
the ability to write off large portions of their sovereign loans, and to withstand
pressures to lend new money. Thus, the sovereign debt no longer presented
such a severe systemic threat to the international financial system. Equally im-
portantly, it had become clear that the most heavily indebted countries would
never regain financial stability without some form of debt and debt service re-
duction. Thus, by 1989 the balance of concerns for the IFIs had begun to shift
from a concern with the survival of the creditors to a concern about the future of
the debtors and their ability to both pay back their debts and develop sus-
tainably.
In response to these developments, in March 1989, then US Secretary of the
Treasury Nicholas Brady announced a new initiative designed to encourage
banks voluntarily to reduce the debt burdens of LDC debtors and securitize
their sovereign loans by converting them into bonds, known as Brady bonds.64
One consequence of the Brady plan was that it promoted securitization of third
world debt instruments, which helped middle income countries (MICs) access
financial markets. It also helped contribute to the MICs reduced need for fund-
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66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 The Acting Chair’s Summing Up-Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private
Creditors-Further Consideration of the Good Faith Criterion Executive Board Meeting
02/92, 4 September 2002.
ing from the IFIs, which, in turn, has helped create an existential crisis for the
institutions, particularly the IMF.
Another consequence was that it contributed to changes in the IMF’s policy
concerning lending to debtors in arrears. By the late 1980s banks became in-
creasingly reluctant to provide additional financing to their debtor States, which
caused growing delays in Fund support for adjustment programs. The Fund’s
policy also resulted in providing creditors with excessive leverage over debtors,
as it gave them a de facto veto over Fund arrangements. In 1989 the Fund modi-
fied its arrears policy to tolerate temporary arrears to commercial banks in order
to remove the banks’ de facto veto over Fund support.65
This policy was expanded in 1999 to encompass arrears on bonds and other
nonbank forms of financing from private creditors.66 IMF Directors agreed that
lending into arrears to private creditors (including bondholders and commercial
banks) should be on a case-by-case basis and only where: (i) prompt IMF sup-
port is considered essential for the successful implementation of the member’s
adjustment program; and (ii) the member is pursuing appropriate policies and is
making a good faith effort67 to reach a collaborative agreement with its credi-
tors. In 2002, the IMF Directors confirmed that lending into sovereign arrears
to private creditors continued to be a useful tool.68 There have been subsequent
Board discussions of the policy but it has not been changed in any significant
way until the present time.
It is important to note that in legal terms, the IMF’s policy of lending into ar-
rears amounts to recognition that it should use its leverage to help its Member
States uphold the principle of rebus sic stantibus in their negotiations with their
creditors. In these circumstances, the principle, while not resulting in a com-
plete excuse for non-performance, at least constitutes a legal and principled
basis for providing some relief to the borrower because of the changed circum-
stances surrounding its debt commitments.
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1. Different Treatment for the Debts of LICs and MICs
a) The HIPC Initiative and its Aftermath
One consequence of the IFIs policy for dealing with developing country debt
began to become clearer during this third period – the growing importance of
the IFIs as creditors of low income country debtors (LICs). This had occurred
because as other creditors reduced their exposure to the LICs, the IFIs both in
relative and absolute terms became larger and more important creditors. This
eventually made it extremely difficult for these countries to resolve their debt
crises without the IFIs participating as creditors in any debt renegotiation
scheme.
By 1996, it had become clear that many low income countries, despite their
hard efforts to implement the policies advocated by the IFIs, were unable to de-
velop unless their debt burden was reduced. To respond to this situation, the key
creditor countries announced the creation of the Highly Indebted Poor Country
(HIPC) Initiative. This initiative, designed to reduce the debt burden of qualify-
ing countries, was enhanced in 1999 as an outcome of a comprehensive review
by IDA and the IMF, including public consultations. The HIPC Initiative of-
fered the prospect of debt forgiveness on official credits and commercial credits
to a group of 33 low income countries who could show that they were comply-
ing with the policy conditions of the IFIs but were still unable to reduce their
debt below certain key indicator levels.69
The original HIPC initiative was not particularly generous because it required
the debtor State to show a three year track record of compliance with IFIs poli-
cies before it could qualify for debt relief. Thereafter, another indeterminate
period of compliance followed before the debtor States actually obtained this
relief. The 1999 revisions reduced the debt ratio thresholds, which enabled a
broader group of countries to qualify for larger volumes of debt relief. More-
over, a number of creditors started to provide earlier assistance to qualifying
countries, thereby providing incentives to speed up reforms.70 The IFI role
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during in these initiatives was both advisory and financial – they continued to
provide new financial support.
The HIPC Initiative raised an important legal concern for the IFIs. Until this
initiative, they had always claimed that they did not reschedule debt and their
position as “preferred creditors” had always been respected by the other credi-
tors. They had always justified this position by arguing that they continued to
lend to their Member States even after all other creditors were refusing the
country credit.
The position of the IFIs became untenable when it became clear that the
HIPC initiative was insufficient and that a broader debt relief initiative was
needed. This resulted in November 2005 in an initiative called the Multi-Lateral
Debt Initiative (MDRI).71 The MDRI provides HIPCs new breathing space to
strengthen their financial position and support their efforts to reach the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDGs). It also provides for the possibility of debt
relief from the IFIs themselves.72 Qualifying countries may receive MDRI relief
financed from bilateral contributions to the PRGF Trust Subsidy Account,
subject to the consent of contributors and other applicable requirements.73
Most participating IFIs have provided debt relief under the HIPC Initiative
and the MDRI. Official creditors continue to provide debt relief in line with
their original HIPC commitments. These creditors have also provided debt
relief on a bilateral basis beyond that committed under the HIPC Initiative.
Commercial creditors’ lawsuits against HIPCs have presented a challenge to
the implementation of the HIPC Initiative. In response to these problems, the
World Bank and the IMF have taken the position of encouraging broad and eq-
uitable participation by all creditors in the HIPC Initiative. According to a joint
WB-IMF report, commercial creditors’ lawsuits against HIPCs presented, and
in some cases still present, a big challenge to the implementation of the HIPC
Initiative. In response to these problems, the international community has inten-
sified its efforts to discourage litigation against HIPCs, and the World Bank and
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the IMF have continued their intense efforts to encourage broad and equitable
participation by all creditors in the HIPC Initiative.74
Lawsuits against HIPCs have been filed mainly in London, Paris, and New
York with nine, seven, and six cases respectively. Another fifteen legal disputes
have been filed in local courts in HIPC countries.75 There are also international
commercial arbitration proceedings involving four HIPCs (Cameroon, the Dem-
ocratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of Congo, and São Tomé and Príncipe).
Litigating creditors have generally won lawsuits against HIPCs. Of the 44
current cases, 26 creditors have obtained court judgments in their favor against
seven HIPCs (Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of
Congo, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zambia), amounting to about 1
billion US Dollar. Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zambia have already paid a cu-
mulative 30 million US Dollar to some of their litigating creditors, including
through out-of-court settlements. In the case of the Republic of Congo, creditors
have obtained at least five enforceable court judgments against the country and
are seeking to enforce them in multiple jurisdictions. Fourteen lawsuits (against
Cameroon, Guyana, Honduras, Sierra Leone, and Zambia) are still pending.76
b) Treatment of the MICs
During the 1990s, the difference in the situation of low income and medium
income debtor countries became much starker. Medium income countries
(MICs), particularly those known as emerging market countries, found their fi-
nancing options expanding as they were able to tap international capital markets
and so gain access to new groups of commercial creditors such as insurance
companies, mutual funds and hedge funds. The result was that for many of
these countries borrowing from the IFIs, with their perceived cumbersome pro-
cedures and more stringent borrowing conditions, became less attractive. The
major benefit for them of the IFIs was that they offered the countries a “stamp
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of approval” that indicated to other potential sources of funds that the countries
were following suitable policies and were acceptable credit risks.
The IFIs played a critical and influential role in the MICs during the 1990s
and early 2000s. They helped these countries access the funding that was now
available to them from the international financial markets by providing them
advice on how to interact with these creditors and by communicating to credi-
tors their confidence in the MICs as debtors. They also encouraged the MICs to
adopt policies that would integrate themselves into the international financial
market, thus making it easier for external creditors to invest in their financial in-
stitutions and financial instruments.
The consequences of this policy were exposed by the Asian financial crisis in
the mid-1990s and in the subsequent crises in such countries as Russia, Brazil
and Argentina. These crises not only raised questions about the competence of
the IFIs, particularly the IMF, as advisors to the MICs but also about their fi-
nancing roles. The latter was challenged because it was revealed that the IMF
was attaching large numbers of conditions to its financing and that many of
these conditions seemed connected to promoting a particular policy agenda. The
reaction in many MICs was to work to reduce their exposure to the IMF, and to
develop such large reserves that they could protect themselves in times of finan-
cial difficulty.
The IFIs actions in this third stage created a legal challenge for the IFIs, which
is still not fully resolved. The first aspect of this challenge, discussed above, is
the scope of operations of the IFIs and concern that they may be exceeding their
mandates. This issue raises questions about the interpretation of their Articles of
Agreements. In the case of the IMF, this means interpreting its international
monetary mandate as set out in Article 1 of its Articles of Agreement. For the
WB, it means both interpreting the political prohibition in its charter and decid-
ing the amount of policy based lending that is permissible under the “special
circumstance” exception to its project based lending requirement. The issue also
raises questions about what happens when the IFI is exceeding the scope of its
mandate. While in principal the IFIs should be responsible for any adverse
effects of any operations that exceed the scope of its mandate, it is not clear if
or how they can be held accountable. This is turn raises concerns about in-
ternational organizational responsibility and the limits of organizational account-
ability.
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Another issue that arose from the MIC debt problems was that it highlighted
the complexities of addressing debt crises in which the major form of debt was
securities, particularly bearer securities. In fact, it was another indication that
the international financial system had moved beyond being a system in which
the primary commercial lenders of international development financing were
banks to one in which the primary form of financing was securitized debt in-
struments that could be held by almost any institution or any individual. This
complicated situation briefly stimulated debate about what reforms were needed
to promote more effective management of sovereign debt.
2. Search for New Approaches
a) The Case of Iraq
Following the defeat of Saddam Hussein, an important issue relating to the
future of Iraq was what to do about its sovereign debt. US diplomatic efforts
persuaded Paris Club members to agree to forgive 80 % of debts owed to them
by Iraq. The US based its arguments on the concept of “odious debt.”77 These
arguments were inconsistent with the longstanding US assertion that sovereign
debt agreements are binding under international law, regardless of how the
proceeds are used (through the application of pacta sunt servanda). When this
news became public, one newspaper noted: “Some developing country policy-
makers and debt-relief campaign groups have contrasted the generous and swift
relief being considered for Iraq with slow progress in reducing the debt of
highly indebted African economies.”78 At the same time, legal scholars pointed
out that the legal principles of odious debt, and rebus sic stantibus, as well as
the examples of the treatment of sovereign debts during the German unification
and the succession of Yugoslavia, and African debt incurred during the Cold
War, support the argument that current Iraqi debt should be discharged.79
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However, convincing (or not) one finds the justification for providing such
debt relief, it establishes a precedent that can be used to demand substantial debt
relief for other countries in difficulty. As James Wolfensohn, the former presi-
dent of the World Bank, noted: “America’s determination to write off Saddam
Hussein’s […] debt mountain has opened the door to a more generous deal for
the most impoverished countries in Africa.”80
b) Sovereign Debt Renegotiation Mechanism (SDRM)
In September 2002, the International Monetary and Financial Committee
(IMFC) requested the IMF to develop a concrete SDRM proposal for consider-
ation at the April 2003 Spring meetings. The proposal was envisioned as “both
a crisis resolution and a crisis mitigation device that could help limit sovereign
debt crises if triggered early enough to prevent the severe economic dislocation
that often occurs when countries resist dealing with their debt problem.”81 The
proposal aimed to provide a legal framework for collective creditor negotia-
tions, with several characteristics:
1. Agreement by a supermajority of creditors to a debt restructuring agreement
that would be binding on all creditors covered by the SDRM; minority creditors
would be prevented from blocking such agreements.
2. Mechanisms to prevent disruptive legal action by creditors while negotiations
are under way.
3. Assurances to creditors that debtors will negotiate in good faith and pursue
policies that help protect their claims and limit the dislocation in the economy.
4. Some form of debtor-driven protection including restructuring of new private
financing in order to facilitate the debtor’s ongoing economic activity.
5. A dispute resolution forum to oversee the process – verify claims, ensure the
integrity of the voting process, adjudicate possible disputes, and certify the debt
restructuring agreement.82
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The proposal has not yet been implemented, in spite of the fact that the inter-
national financial system lacks a strong legal framework for the predictable and
orderly restructuring of sovereign debt, to reduce the high cost of default.83
c) International Investment Arbitration
The announcement by the Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders
(GCAB)84 that it may initiate international investment arbitration against its
debtors could potentially create a new precedent in sovereign debt restruc-
turings. This announcement followed the introduction of the Argentine law pro-
hibiting the government from reopening the debt exchange or engaging in
private or judicial settlements with creditors that did not accept its restructuring
offer which involved significant losses for the creditors. GCAB contends that
bondholders should be able to rely on the bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
between Argentina and a number of G–20 countries. They further argue that the
new Argentine proposal constitutes, under the BITs, an expropriation of bond-
holders’ claims. Consequently, pursuant to these BITs, they can bring invest-
ment arbitrations, under the rules of the International Center for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID).85 However, given the unprecedented nature of
these actions, their outcome is uncertain.
D. Evaluating the IFIs Conduct and International Law
There are three dimensions to the question of the IFIs, international law and
their debt operations. They are the compliance of the IFIs with their customary
international law obligations, their interpretation and implementation of their
mandates, and their accountability for their actions. Each of these will briefly be
considered in this section.
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I. Customary International Law
As has been discussed above, it is difficult to identify many principles that
are applicable as customary international law to the IFIs. For example, while
there may be general obligations requiring them to respect human rights, it is
difficult to claim that this obligation has great specificity. Similarly, it is even
harder to identify any customary environmental law principles that can be
applied to the IFIs. Thus, in the final analysis the only customary international
legal principles that are clearly applicable to the IFIs in their dealings with sov-
ereign debt issues are pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus.
It is clear that the IFIs have been taking both these principles into account,
including their good faith requirement, in their management of the debt prob-
lems of their Member States. As a result, at different times they have empha-
sized one or the other of these principles in the role that they have played during
the debt crises of their Member States. They have emphasized pacta sunt
servanda when they believe that their primary obligation is to help enforce debt
obligations and uphold the sanctity of contract for the sake of the functioning of
the international financial system. On the other hand, they have been willing to
champion a version of rebus sic stantibus (i.e. debt forgiveness and lending into
arrears) when they have seen that the debtor countries need substantial debt
relief in order to meet their obligations to their own citizens. Thus, regardless of
whether or not one agrees with how they have applied these principles, it is
clear that the IFIs have met their customary international legal obligations
during their engagement with their Member States in debt difficulty over the
past 25 years.
II. Articles of Agreement
The responsibility of the IFIs towards overcoming the debt problems of their
Member States is also based on their mandates, as defined in their Articles of
Agreements. In this regard, it is important to note that according to the VCLT,
the Articles should be interpreted according to their purpose, the context in
which they operate and the ordinary meaning of their words.86 As has been dis-
cussed above, the IFIs Articles of Agreement are drafted in exquisitely ambigu-
ous language that provides them with a reasonable degree of flexibility in
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regard to its interpretation – although as the comments cited above from Shiha-
ta suggest this flexibility has its limits. In light of these two observations, we
can conclude that, in brief, the mandate of the IFIs in regard to sovereign debt
is to help debtor countries overcome their debt crises in ways that are not de-
structive of national or international prosperity, that do not undermine the inter-
national monetary and financial system and that contribute to the long term
growth and development of these countries. The issue of IFI compliance with
these mandates raises some important legal issues, as explained below.
First is the problem of mission creep. As was discussed above, the IFIs have
expanded the scope of their missions considerably since 1982 and have begun
to deal with issues of governance and other social matters that call into question
the World Bank’s compliance with its political prohibition and the IMF’s com-
pliance with its mandate not to interfere in the domestic social affairs of its
Member States. The resulting criticisms of the IMF’s or WB’s “mission creep”
can be divided into two groups. First, there are those who criticize the Bretton
Woods twins for the way they have gone about expanding their mission, rather
than criticizing the fact that they have chosen to do so. This is a criticism about
the direction and content of the mission creep. Some of these critics have con-
tended mission creep feeds a tendency “to politicize the two organizations in
ways that will ultimately undermine their efficacy.”87 Defenders of the World
Bank and the IMF counter the first argument by stating that the mandate of
these institutions is sufficiently broad to allow the arrangements that they have
ultimately instituted.88 For them, the very vagueness of the mandate of the
World Bank and the IMF as contained in their Articles of Agreement provides
the necessary support to their arguments. However, these defenders have been
unable to clearly articulate what limits the political constraints in their Articles
in fact impose on the IFIs or how they should deal with the jurisdictional con-
flicts with other international organizations that are created by their mission
creep.
The second group of mission creep critics focuses on the content of the IFIs
expanded mission, and how it is implemented through the conditionality attached
to their financing. These conditions now include issues such as legal and judicial
reform, gender issues, decentralization, and relations between the State and the
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market.89 These critics argue that such direct engagement with long-term
structural issues raises two important concerns relating to the compliance of the
IFIs with their obligations under their mandates. First, they contend that it raises
questions about the obligations of the IFIs to respect international human rights
and environmental law and the obligations of their Member States in this regard.
While acknowledging that the IFIs are not signatories to the key international or
regional treaties on this subject, these critics maintain that as subjects of
international law, they at least have an obligation to ensure that their financing
operations and the conditions attached thereto do not undermine their Member
States’ ability to comply with own international legal commitments. Some of
these critics question the ability of the IFIs, given their specialized mandates, to
assess these commitments and ensure compliance with them. They also contend
that the IFIs may fail to meet even this limited international legal obligation when
they support complex and controversial policies and projects that involve, for
example, forced resettlement of people or environmental degradation.
Over the years, the World Bank has recognized that there is some merit in
this criticism and has even tried to address some of these points. First, it has
adopted a set of “safeguard policies” to ensure that there is more effective treat-
ment of social and environmental issues in its operations. In the case of the
environmental policies, the World Bank has explicitly noted that it will act to
ensure that its Member States comply with their international legal commit-
ments. It has also established the Inspection Panel as an independent body
reporting directly to the Board, to evaluate compliance with these policies.90
The World Bank has also begun to address the question of its human rights re-
sponsibilities in its operations.91 The IMF however has not been as forthcoming
as the World Bank.92
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A second set of legal issues relates to the meaning of the political prohibition
in the Articles of the World Bank. Interestingly, the Articles do not define either
what “political” or “economic” means for these purposes. Ibrahim Shihata, the
former General Counsel attempted to give some meaning to these terms in his
legal opinion on governance. However, his explanation of which issues are suf-
ficiently “economic” to be considered part of the Bank’s mandate is too general
to be fully useful.93 The result, in effect, is to give the management and staff of
the Bank the discretion to decide this issue. This in turn makes it extremely dif-
ficult for outsiders to understand the basis for their decisions and results in a
perception that the political prohibition is applied in an arbitrary way.
The situation in the IMF in some ways is more complicated because there is
no explicit political prohibition. It has merely interpreted its Articles, which ad-
monish it, to pay due regard to the domestic social conditions of its members, as
amounting to a prohibition against taking political considerations into account
in its operations.94 It is very hard for any outsider to understand either how a
macro-economically focused institution can do its job without taking political
considerations into account or how in fact the IMF applies this prohibition. This
again results in it being accused of acting in a relatively arbitrary manner in this
regard.
III. Accountability
It is important to note that as the First Report of the ILA’s Committee of Ac-
countability of International Organizations states: “Accountability is not a notion
which, for the sake of its operationality, is or has to be viewed as monolithic,
calling for uniform and indiscriminate application. Such rigidity would not
survive the complexities of international reality.”95 Instead, accountability is
multifaceted, with various degrees of consequences ranging from oversight,
monitoring, and evaluation processes to censorship or other forms of sanctions
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to the attribution of legal liability for injuries, resulting in binding remedial
action.96
The expansion of the mission of the IFIs has raised concerns about their ac-
countability in two regards. First, given their increased engagement with the
policy-making and governance structures of those Member States that use their
services, there is a concern about how easily some of the Member States are
able to make their concerns about IFIs policies heard in the Boards of Executive
Directors of the IFIs. In this sense, the literature has witnessed an on-going de-
bate over voting rights within IFIs.97
Second, the fact that the IFIs are playing this expanded role in their member
countries means that they come into more direct contact with citizens and other
non-state actors. However, there has historically only been indirect and limited
ways in which these non-state actors and private citizens can seek to hold the
IFIs accountable for their actions. Legally, the only route was for them to advo-
cate to their governments to hold the IFIs accountable for the harm caused to
their citizens. In 1994, the World Bank altered this situation when it created the
World Bank Inspection Panel.98 This example, subsequently copied in all re-
gional development banks and the IFC, has created a new mechanism through
which private actors can hold IFIs accountable.99 In particular, private actors
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who believe that they have been harmed or threatened with harm because of the
failure of the Bank to comply with its own policies and procedures in an opera-
tion in their country, can petition the Panel to investigate the project and make
findings to the Board of the Bank about the staff and management’s compliance
with the applicable policies. These mechanisms are relatively new and the
oldest, the World Bank Inspection, has only had 52 petitions. Nevertheless, it
would seem that these mechanisms, despite concerns about their efficacy, have
resulted in increased accountability for these institutions.100
E. Conclusion
The world today is very different from the one for which the World Bank and
IMF were created. Powerful political, social, environmental and economic
forces are changing the way in which business is done in both developing and
rich countries and are forcing all actors to adapt and adopt this new reality.101
In such a complex environment, it is a challenge for the IFIs to meet their sub-
stantive mandates of overseeing the international monetary system and promot-
ing development in their member countries. It is even more difficult for them to
do so in the abnormal conditions created by a sovereign debt crisis in a Member
State or group of Member States. When to these challenges are added the
requirement of complying with international legal requirements as non-specific
as those arising from general principles of customary international law and from
flexibly drafted Articles of Agreement, it is not surprising that the IFIs have a
mixed record for compliance with their international legal obligations.
They are conforming with their most unambiguous customary international
legal obligations and, at least to a meaningful extent, with their obligations to
provide those affected by their actions with some form of accountability. How-
ever, they have been less successful in fully complying with the requirements of
their flexible Articles. Their failure to adequately address the consequences of
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their mission creep is an important omission that has had adverse consequences
for some of their Member States and global economic governance. It also raises
important questions about the role of the IFIs in the protection and promotion of
international human rights and environmental law for the future.
Finally, it is our hope that this paper has demonstrated that the question of
the IFIs and their compliance with international law both during their debt-
related operations and more generally is a topic that merits further investigation.
This is particularly the case, given that these organizations are facing complex
and diverse economic, financial, political, social and environmental issues, that
include the rising importance of competing official and private sources of
finance for developing countries, climate change, dealing with failed States and
post-conflict States, the current efforts to adjust the governance structures of the
IMF and World Bank to reflect the evolving shifts in global political and eco-
nomic power, and, at the time of writing, the incipient efforts to reform the in-
stitutions and arrangements for global economic governance.102 Many of these
issues will raise interesting international legal problems for the IFIs.
